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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Maastricht Treaty went into effect in November 1993 with eleven  
European Countries joining forces to form the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
The EMU was a drastic new initiative to bring economic integration one step 
further by creating a common currency for Europe – a monetary union that would 
abolish the transaction costs of converting one EC currency to another, as well 
as eliminating exchange rate variability and uncertainty among traders and 
investors.  
 The eleven member states were required to meet several convergence 
criteria prescribed in the Maastricht Treaty relating to inflation, interest rates, 
government debt, and exchange rate volatility. High inflation countries such as 
Italy and Ireland are working hard to force down their inflation close to that of the 
three best performing member states, such as Germany. 
 This paper examines how disinflation in high inflation economies affects 
unemployment levels. According to Keynesian macroeconomic theories, a 
decrease in inflation will cause an increase in unemployment in the short run. 
Due to high inflation over the years among countries like Italy and Ireland, their 
expected inflation rate is significantly high. As a result, when the government 
starts a process of disinflation though restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, 
economic activity declines, and significant short run increase in unemployment 
follows.  
 In opposition to the Keynesian theories, contemporary rationale 
expectations theory states that a country’s commitment and its announcement to 
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join the Monetary Union could create an effect that will lower the citizens’ 
expectations of inflation levels. If the monetary authority is known for its 
reputation and credibility of policy commitment, then inflation levels could be 
reduced without the cost of significant unemployment. 
 The implication of possible short-term unemployment is crucial. High 
inflation countries may have to bear the heavy cost of unemployment in order to 
meet the convergence criteria. The decision to join the EMU might change if 
there exist a significant increase in unemployment, resulting in a severe impact 
on the economy. High unemployment leading to recession could subsequently 
cause failure of the European Monetary Union.  
 Section II offers a historical background of the EMU, Section III examines 
the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and the Philips Curve that relates 
inflation to unemployment. Section IV provides an empirical model that looks at 
unemployment in the economy of the EMU states. Section V presents and 
interprets the regression results. Section VI gives the implications of the results 
on European Economies and offers policy implications and Section VII concludes 
this paper.  
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In line with the European Union’s objective to create an economically 
integrated region that will have common trade regulations, the European 
Monetary System was established in 1979. A subset of countries established an 
adjustable pegged exchange rate system through the Exchange Rate 
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Mechanism (ERM) where countries were required to maintain their actual 
exchange rate within an allowed fluctuation band of plus minus 2.25 percent. 
When some countries were unable to keep their exchange rates within the stated 
ERM band, it was revised and realigned to a larger range that will be easier for 
some member states to maintain. By the 1990s, several countries such as Italy, 
Spain, Britain, and Portugal joined the ERM with bands of 6 percent.  
This fixed exchange rate system created a discipline effect. This discipline 
effect is an evidence of the Law of One Price. This theory states that in markets 
free of transportation costs and official trade barriers, identical goods from two 
countries should be sold at identical prices after accounting for the exchange 
rates (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).  
This brings us to the theory of Purchasing Power Parity that states that the 
exchange rate between two countries is equal to the ratio of the countries’ price 
levels. In floating exchange rate systems, the exchange rate would naturally 
move to the purchasing power parity (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997). But since the 
EMU has fixed exchange rates, it is changes in the price levels that will have to 
adjust for the disparities. Germany was considered as the lead in the system due 
to its size and the reputation of its central bank. Because of this, countries 
became disciplined by the fixed exchange rates to lower their inflation similar to 
that of Germany. (Pugel, Lindert, 2000) 
Europe continued to strive for a more integrated economy by dismantling 
barriers to trade and removing capital controls by 1990. These increased 
movements of trade and capital flows called for even more integration in terms of 
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inflation rates and interest rates in order to avoid speculative capital flight 
(Hughes, 1999). Speculative capital flight occurs because of differences in 
interest rates between two countries where the country with a higher interest rate 
will attract capital from the country with a lower interest rate. Because of the high 
degree of capital mobility between the EMU states, capital moves across borders 
very quickly once interest rate disparities are present.  
The Maastricht Treaty was drafted in 1991 and became effective in 
November 1993, which called for the establishment of the European Monetary 
Union where countries will use a single union-wide currency. Countries intending 
to join the Union must meet five criteria, called the convergence criteria. They 
were (Pugel, Lindert, 2000) 
a. Inflation rate must be no higher than 1.5 percentage points above 
the average of the 3 lowest inflation countries,  
b. Exchange rate must be within the ERM bands without realignment 
for 2 preceding years of joining,  
c. Interest rates on government bonds must be no higher than 2 
percentage points above the average of the 3 lowest inflation 
countries,  
d. Budget deficit must be no larger than 3 percent than its GDP, and 
e. Gross government debt must be no larger than 60 percent of its 
GDP.  
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As mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on the first criterion – restriction 
of  inflation rates. The following section will detail why the contractionary policies 
to decrease inflation may create a problem for the economy. 
 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas helps in explaining the rationale 
behind economic integration. But before getting into that, we need to understand 
why disinflation causes unemployment. The Philips Curve is a theory that best 
illustrates that phenomenon.  
 
Philips Curve   
The Philips curve posits that the inflation rate is dependent on expected 
inflation (πe), cyclical unemployment (u – un) and supply shocks (ε). The equation 
takes the following form: 
π = πe - β( u – un) + ε 
 Based on the assumption of adaptive expectations, people form their 
expectations of inflation from past or recently observed inflation. Therefore πe can 
be written as the previous year’s inflation level, π-1. This means that if a country is 
at the level of natural unemployment and price levels have been rising quickly, 
then it will be expected to continue rising because past inflation have influenced 
people’s expectations on future inflation. This implies that inflation is inertial and 
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price levels will continue to rise at the prevailing inflation rate until some event 
such as a recession (which increases unemployment above natural 
unemployment) or a supply shock (Mankiw, 1997). 
 Cyclical unemployment means the deviation of unemployment from the 
natural rate. An increase in unemployment other than the natural rate causes 
cyclical unemployment to increase and as a result, the inflation rate is pulled 
downwards. The term β determines the responsiveness of inflation level to the 
change in cyclical unemployment. Figure 1 shows the relationship between 
inflation and unemployment in terms of the Philips curve (Mankiw, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure1   
 
 
Therefore, in order to influence inflation levels, the government can 
increase or decrease aggregate demand (which will in turn result in changes in 
the level of unemployment) through fiscal and monetary policies. In the 
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levels down to that of the three best performing EU states. This means that the 
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government will have to impose some kind of restrictive fiscal policy to fight the 
inertial inflation. When that happens, aggregate demand falls and as a result, the 
economy is faced with a recession in the short run.  
 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
 The Philips Curve tells us why inflation and unemployment are inversely 
related, implying that the convergence criteria could be very costly in the short 
run for some EU countries. Now we need to reevaluate whether the European 
Union is suitable as a common currency area where exchange rates are fixed to 
the area’s currency. In deciding the costs and benefits of joining a fixed 
exchange rate system, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas predicts that 
fixed exchange rates are most appropriate for areas that are closely integrated in 
terms of international trade and factor movements (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997). 
 Developed by Robert Mundell in the 1960s, this theory suggests that a 
high degree of economic integration among countries will lead to higher 
monetary efficiency gains when these countries fix their exchange rates against 
the area’s currency (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).  The key impediment to a 
successful common currency area is the large differences between countries in 
terms of its economy, its citizens’ expectations on inflation and interests of the 
individual states. To illustrate, Mundell uses a simple model of two economically 
opposite entities that are initially at full employment and balance of payments 
equilibrium. Mundell’s argument lies on two assumptions: 1) money wages and 
prices cannot be reduced in the short run without causing unemployment (as 
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predicted by the Philips Curve), and 2) monetary authorities act to prevent 
inflation.  In the original document written by Mundell in the American Economic 
Review, he names the two entities A and B and illustrates the effect of a shift in 
demand from the goods of entity B to entity A: 
 
Suppose first that the entities are countries with national currencies. 
The shift of demand from B to A causes unemployment in B and 
inflationary pressure in A. To the extent that prices are allowed to 
rise in A the change in terms of trade will relieve B of some of the 
burden of adjustment. But if A tightens credit restrictions to prevent 
prices from rising all the burden of adjustment is thrust onto country 
B; what is needed is a reduction in B’s real income and if this 
cannot be effected by a change in the terms of trade—because B 
cannot lower, and A will not raise, prices—it must be accomplished 
by a decline in B’s output and employment. The policy of surplus 
countries in restraining prices therefore imparts a recessive 
tendency to the world economy on fixed exchange rates or (more 
generally) to a currency area with many separate currencies.  
(Mundell, 1961) 
 
Mundell then adds more assumptions into this model by saying that the 
entities are now within a region of closed economy with a common currency and 
the national government of both countries now pursues a full employment policy. 
He shows that the same shift in demand from B to A causes not only 
unemployment in country B and inflation in country A, but also a surplus in A’s 
balance of payments. Since the priority now is to maintain full employment, the 
central bank might increase money supply to correct the unemployment in B, but 
that will only aggravate A’s inflationary pressure. Therefore Mundell concludes 
that forming a common currency area cannot prevent both unemployment and 
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inflation at the same time among its members if they are not highly economically 
integrated (Mundell, 1961).  
A different representation of Mundell’s model by Grauwe takes on the 
same assumptions but this time, he uses Germany and France as examples. 
Like Mundell, Grauwe demonstrates that the shift in demand causes 
unemployment in France and inflationary pressure in Germany. But Grauwe 
argues that there are two mechanisms that will bring back equilibrium in the two 
countries. The two mechanisms are wage flexibility and mobility of labor. If there 
is sufficient free movement of labor between European countries, then an 
increase in unemployment in France will cause the unemployed workers to look 
for jobs in Germany, thus balancing out the disequilibrium, as long as wages are 
flexible (Grauwe, 1994).  
Unfortunately, labor does not move as freely as we would like it to be 
among the EU regions. Perhaps the most apparent barrier to mobility of labor 
among EU countries is the barrier of language and culture. An econometric study 
by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley found that 
regional unemployment rates are much similar in the United States than the 
national unemployment rates among EU members. This implies that there is 
some magnitude of differences in the demand for labor and wages among these 
EU states. (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).  
Another barrier to mobility of labor is caused by government regulation. As 
in many countries, the government typically requires potential employees to 
obtain residency status before he or she is allowed to work in the country. 
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Therefore it becomes harder for unemployed workers in say, France, to look for 
employment in Germany (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).  
While the Philips Curve suggests that low inflation will lead to high 
unemployment, the unemployed population can actually obtain jobs from other 
member states if labor is mobile across borders with little restrictions. If this is 
true, then the unemployment gap is likely to close up and this means that while 
inflation decreases, unemployment is not affected. In a way, this would invalidate 
the assumptions of the Philips Curve.  
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The empirical model utilizes the Philips curve to construct a regression 
model to test its validity in four high inflation countries in the EMU. Data was 
obtained from the International Financial Statistics Database published by the 
International Monetary Fund. Based on the Philips Curve, it can be hypothesized 
that inflation and unemployment is inversely related. Note that the Philips Curve 
takes the following form:  
π = πe - β( u – un) + ε   Equation 1 
This equation implies that actual inflation will equal expected inflation if 
unemployment equals natural unemployment. This means that inflation is 100% 
inertial and if all else equal, people’s expectations on inflation, which will be 
based on last year’s inflation, will be a perfect predictor of actual inflation. This is 
obviously not completely accurate. Expectations are merely assumptions based 
on things such as past experiences that should not be a perfect indicator of 
actual inflation levels.  
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Before moving on to formulate the empirical model, two assumptions need 
to be applied: 1) past inflation is used as a proxy for expected inflation, implying 
an adaptive expectations model (therefore πe = π -1), and, 2) natural 
unemployment is fixed. Next, to illustrate that inflation is inertial but not 100% 
inertial, the coefficient θ is assigned to π -1 as follows: 
 
π = θπ-1 - β( u – un) + ε   Equation 2 
 In his explanation of the Philips Curve, Mankiw posits that θ = 1, implying 
that actual inflation is 100% inertial. This means that prices are sticky and 
people’s expectation on this year’s inflation is heavily dependent on the level of 
previous year’s inflation. Therefore if θ is equal to or close to one, there is little 
flexibility in prices and consequently wages. On the other hand, this modified 
Philips curve model allows for θ to be some value so as to not restrain it to the 
value of one.  
By manipulating the terms in equation 2, the following equation was 
obtained:  (The details of this transformation can be found in Appendix 1)     
 
u = un + 1/β(θπ-1 - π) + ε/β  Equation 3 
where  u = unemployment 
 un = natural unemployment 
 π-1 = inflation lagged by one year 
 π = inflation 
ε = error term 
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Based on the relationship between unemployment and inflation observed 
in equation 3, a partially complete regression model was formulated with 
unemployment as the dependent variable. What is done here is merely changing 
the terms in equation 3 into a form that can be easily recognized as a regression 
model: 
 
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2INFLAT + e   Equation 4 
 
 
Where UNEMP = u 
  INFLAT_1 = π -1 
  INFLAT = π 
   α  = un 
   α1 = θ/β 
   α2 = 1/β 
   e = ε/β 
 
The following hypotheses were derived from this: 
1. Expected inflation (INFLAT_1) is positively related to this year’s 
unemployment, that is, α1 is expected to carry a positive sign. The rationale 
behind this idea is that when business people expect high inflation, they are 
likely to lower costs. One way to achieve lower cost is by hiring fewer workers 
and this directly causes higher unemployment.  
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2. Inflation (INFLAT) is negatively related to unemployment, that is, α2 is 
expected to carry a negative sign. When the government tries to lower 
inflation through contractionary fiscal policies, aggregate demand decreases. 
The resulting decreased income level makes businesses poorer and they end 
up hiring fewer workers. 
This regression was run for data from four high inflation countries, Finland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Annual data were used and they spanned across 12 
years: beginning from the year 1985 to 1997. 
Since this regression required the usage of cross sectional and time series 
data, three dummy variables representing Finland, Italy and Portugal were added 
into the regression. Spain was the omitted variable.  
 
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2 INFLAT + ∝3FINLAND + ∝4ITALY + 
∝5PORTUGAL + e     MODEL 1 
 
These dummy country variables are shift parameters that are meant to 
pick up the effect of country specific characteristics on unemployment. Since 
Spain is the omitted variable, the constant represents the predicted level of 
natural unemployment for Spain. The coefficients attached to the individual 
dummy variables represent that particular country’s natural rate of unemployment 
with respect to Spain’s level of natural unemployment. For example if the 
coefficient for FINLAND (α3) is equal to –11.063, this means that Finland’s level 
of natural unemployment is 11.063 percent less than Spain’s. To illustrate, 
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assume that after the regression was run, α=16.569 and α3=-11.063. Therefore 
Finland’s un is equal to: 
16.593 + (-11.063) = 5.53 
Therefore Finland’s predicted level of natural unemployment is 5.53 percent.  
It is also interesting to note that if this and the previous year’s inflation 
equal zero, Model 1 predicts that unemployment will equal natural unemployment 
for the individual countries. 
As we know, the Maastricht treaty was enacted in 1992. At that time, 
countries intending to join the union began decreasing inflation levels. The 
government’s announcement to join the union may have resulted in a change in 
the population’s expectations on inflation. This suggests the hypothesis that there 
may be a structural change within the economy that might cause inflation levels 
to have a different effect on unemployment from the year 1992 onwards. MODEL 
2 attempts to look at this factor. For this regression, two new variables were 
created and added into MODEL 1. The first variable, D92, is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for data from the years 1992 to 1997, and 0 for data from the years 
before 1992. The second variable, called INFL_D92 is an interaction variable 
between D92 and INFLAT. The addition of these two variables into the model 
allowed a kink to take shape. These two variables and variables from MODEL 1 
make up the second regression model: 
 
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2INFLAT + ∝3FINLAND + ∝4ITALY + 
∝5PORTUGAL + α6D92+ α7INFL_D92+ e    MODEL 2 
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 By doing this, the model is controlling for a change in the effect of inflation 
on unemployment for the years after 1991.  
 
V. REGRESSION RESULTS 
MODEL1 
Results of regression from Model 1 are presented in Table 1. The 
coefficient INFLAT_1 was significant to the 0.1 level. INFLAT was significant to 
the 0.005 level. Both these coefficients have the expected sign. With this, we can 
infer that inflation and unemployment is indeed inversely related.  Inserting the 
coefficients into the regression model, the following equation was obtained: 
 
UNEMP = 22.565 + 0.45INFLAT_1 – 0.94INFLAT – 11.161FINLAND – 
8.863ITALY – 12.823PORTUGAL + e          Equation 5 
 
Comparing this to equation 3 (keep in mind that INFLAT_1 = π -1 and INFLAT = 
π), the values for θ/β and 1/β were determined to be 0.45 and 0.94. 
Subsequently, θ can be calculated by dividing θ/β by 1/β (0.45/0.94), giving a 
value of 0.478. A summary of the values obtained for 1/β, θ/β, θ and β is 
presented in Table 3.  
The values obtained for 1/β and θ were then replaced into equation 3: 
u  = un + 0.94(0.478π -1 –  π) + ε/β 
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Bringing natural unemployment, un, over to the left hand side, the following 
equation was obtained:  
u - un = 0.94(0.478π -1 –  π) + ε/β  Equation 6 
This simple equation reveals a lot about the effect of a fall in inflation on 
unemployment. Contrary to the generalized Philips Curve that Mankiw had 
presented, this equation says that θ ≠ 1. Assuming no supply shocks (therefore ε 
= 0), equation 6 calculates the deviation of unemployment from its natural level 
(cyclical unemployment) based on the change in inflation rate from the previous 
year.  
From the equation above, the results from MODEL 1 were used to 
calculate the predicted level of unemployment for individual countries. Table 4 
lists the predicted unemployment levels for Spain based on different decreases in 
inflation levels. The previous year’s inflation is assigned a hypothetical value of 
20%, and it is assumed that there are no supply shocks.  
 Notice that the larger the fall in inflation, the larger the predicted level of 
unemployment. A small decrease in inflation, say from 20% to19%, causes 
13.36% unemployment. On the other hand, a large decrease in inflation causes a 
high level of unemployment. For example, when inflation falls from 20% to 11%, 
unemployment is predicted to be much higher: 20.88%. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that inflation is negatively related to unemployment.  
MODEL 2 
The coefficients and significance of each variable are presented in Table 
2. All variables were significant to the 0.001 level except INFLAT_1 and INFLAT. 
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Both these variables lost their significance in this model. The coefficient of 
INFLAT is extremely low (but still negative) and insignificant. The reason for the 
loss in significance could be that unemployment levels were fairly steady and 
might be unresponsive to changes in inflation in the years before 1992.  
What may be happening is that before the Maastricht Treaty, countries 
were experiencing a steady level of unemployment year after year. Changes in 
inflation may not cause large shifts in unemployment due to the fact that the 
population has been expecting the high inflation levels and steady increase in 
inflation year after year. But after the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the governments 
of high inflation countries intending to join the EMU began forcing down inflation 
levels and this might tighten the economy and put businesses in a position of 
lower wealth.  This, according to the Philips Curve, would result in an increase in 
unemployment.  
Because INFLAT was insignificant in MODEL 2, one might think that 
MODEL 2 invalidates the Philips Curve assumption that inflation is related to 
unemployment. But, a logical explanation behind the low coefficient and 
insignificance of INFLAT before 1992 is that the economy may be experiencing 
steadily high levels of inflation that are of expected levels. This can be explained 
by referring back to the Philips Curve: 
π = πe - β( u – un) + ε 
When expected inflation is equal to actual inflation and assuming no supply 
shocks, unemployment would equal its natural level. Therefore theoretically, no 
matter what level of inflation the economy is experiencing, as long as it is of an 
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expected level, then unemployment will probably not be affected by inflation 
levels. Of course, this is a very shaky conclusion to make because expected 
inflation levels are difficult to measure. Expectations also vary from one individual 
to another. There is a need to assume that the population is rationale and 
educated in its expectations of inflation.  
Nonetheless, we can conclude that unemployment was unresponsive to 
the changes in prices. But on and after the year 1992, the economy went through 
a process of disinflation due to the contractionary fiscal policies applied by the 
government. This squeezed aggregate demand and income levels, which 
consequently lead to a lower inflation levels.  
The coefficient of INFL_D92 represents the effect of inflation on 
unemployment from 1992 onwards. This variable has a negative coefficient of –
1.404 and is very significant. This means that after the introduction of the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992, the model predicts that unemployment levels became 
very responsive to changes in inflation. Again, this may be because of the 
squeeze on aggregate demand.  From this, it is predicted that a kink occurred in 
1992 where unemployment became more responsive to changes in inflation 
compared to the years before 1992.  
 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS / CONLUDING REMARKS 
This study found some evidence of negative effects created by the 
Maastricht Treaty’s first convergence criterion. One of the major conclusions of 
this paper is that disinflation will inevitably create higher unemployment levels. As 
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seen in the results of MODEL 1, the larger the decrease in inflation level within a 
single year, the larger the predicted unemployment would be. Therefore in order 
to avoid the high unemployment levels, the government can plan on a gradual 
decrease in inflation, instead of a rapid decrease. If steps were taken to create a 
gradual disinflation process, people’s expectations on inflation would also 
decrease over time. Higher unemployment levels are certainly inevitable, but it 
will be relatively lower than if the government tries to force down inflation 
drastically in a very short time.  
An interesting future research would be to look at what will happen to 
predicted unemployment when inflation levels decrease at a steady rate over a 
period of several years instead of a drastic decrease. Is it costlier (in terms of 
unemployment) to allow drastic disinflation now and at the same time lowering 
people’s expectations on inflation, (thereby creating lower unemployment levels 
in future)? Or will it be better to allow gradual disinflation and experience 
relatively lower unemployment over a period of several years? 
It may be difficult to present any form of sound and reliable suggestions on 
policymaking decisions at this stage of the study. Remember that the 
convergence criteria also consist of four other factors relating to exchange rates, 
interest rates, budget deficit, and government debt. The first criterion that this 
study looked at may mean that the process of gaining eligibility into the union 
comes with a cost in the form of unemployment, but the other criteria in the 
Maastricht Treaty might offset the negative effects of disinflation.  
20 
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 Further research can include controls for labor mobility and wage 
flexibility as mentioned in the theory section. Another possible future research 
would be to include the effects of other convergence criteria such as the 
restriction on the level of budget deficit and interest rates.  
 The problem of autocorrelation was apparent in both the regressions as 
shown by low Durbin Watson test statistics. Nonetheless, this study made certain 
implications that are crucial in the government’s decision to join the EMU. The 
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment might be too costly for these high 
inflation European countries. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
From the Philips Curve equation,  
π = θπ -1 - β(u – un) + ε 
the terms can be moved around as illustrated: 
β(u – un) = θπ -1 - π + ε 
u – un = 1/β (θπ -1 - π + ε) 
u = un + 1/β(θπ -1 - π) + ε/β 
 
1. Natural unemployment, un, will be assumed as fixed and will therefore be 
the constant in the regression.  
2. θ/β will the coefficient for π -1 
3. 1/β will be the coefficient for π 
4. ε/β will be the error term in the regression 
22 
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TABLE1: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODEL 1 
Adjusted R2 = 0.745 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient (t-statistics) Significance 
CONSTANT  22.565 (18.739) .000 
INFLAT_1 + 0.450 (2.002) .051 
INFLAT - -0.940 (-3.092) .003 
FINLAND ? -11.161 (-8.896) .000 
ITALY ? -8.863 (-7.337) .000 
PORTUGAL ? -12.823 (-9.660) .000 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODEL 2 
Adjusted R2 = 0.865 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient (t-statistics) Significance 
CONSTANT  16.852 (12.269) .000 
INFLAT_1 + 0.240 (1.439) .157 
INFLAT - -6.937E-04 (-0.003) .998 
FINLAND ? -11.396 (-11.664) .000 
ITALY ? -8.717 (-9.898) .000 
PORTUGAL ? -14.550 (-14.119) .000 
D92 + 9.821 (6.521) .000 
INFL_D92 _ -1.404 (-5.085) .000 
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF VALUES FOR 1/β, θ/β, θ AND β 
 VALUE  
θ/β 0.450 ∝1 
1/β 0.940 ∝2 
θ 0.478 0.450 / 0.940 
β 1.064 1 / 0.940 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: PREDICTED UNEMPLOYMENT FOR SPAIN BASED ON ONE-TIME 
ARBITARY CHANGES IN INFLATION LEVELS 
inflat_1 
(π-1) 
INFLAT 
(π) 
%change 
((π-1-π)/π-1)*100 
natural 
unemployment 
(un) 
cyclical 
unemployment 
(u-un) 
predicted 
unemployment* 
(u) 
20 20 0 22.23 -9.8136 12.4164 
20 19 -5 22.23 -8.8736 13.3564 
20 18 -10 22.23 -7.9336 14.2964 
20 17 -15 22.23 -6.9936 15.2364 
20 16 -20 22.23 -6.0536 16.1764 
20 15 -25 22.23 -5.1136 17.1164 
20 14 -30 22.23 -4.1736 18.0564 
20 13 -35 22.23 -3.2336 18.9964 
20 12 -40 22.23 -2.2936 19.9364 
20 11 -45 22.23 -1.3536 20.8764 
20 10 -50 22.23 -0.4136 21.8164 
20 9 -55 22.23 0.5264 22.7564 
20 8 -60 22.23 1.4664 23.6964 
20 7 -65 22.23 2.4064 24.6364 
20 6 -70 22.23 3.3464 25.5764 
20 5 -75 22.23 4.2864 26.5164 
20 4 -80 22.23 5.2264 27.4564 
20 3 -85 22.23 6.1664 28.3964 
20 2 -90 22.23 7.1064 29.3364 
20 1 -95 22.23 8.0464 30.2764 
20 0 -100 22.23 9.8136 32.0436 
* for Spain, the predicted level of natural unemployment is 22.23, based on the 
results of MODEL1. Therefore, in order to calculate unemployment for Spain, we 
add cyclical unemployment (u-un) values to the level of natural unemployment.  
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